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Abstract
We present evidence about the role of rent sharing in fostering the interdependence of
labour markets around the world. Our results draw on a rm-level panel of more than
2,000 multinationals and more than 5,000 of their aliates, covering 47 home and host
countries. We nd considerable evidence that multinationals share prots internationally,
by paying higher wages to their workers in foreign aliates in periods of higher prots.
This occurs even across continents, and not only within Europe, as shown in earlier re-
search. The results are robust to dierent tests, including a falsication exercise based
on `matched' parents. Finally, we show that rent sharing is higher when the aliate is
located in a country with lower economic development and taxation. The dierences be-
tween parents and aliates tend to increase rent sharing while the number of aliates
tends to decrease rent sharing. We argue that these results are consistent with transfer
pricing and bargaining views.
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Labour markets are inuenced by a number of variables, some of which are determined abroad.
Indeed, forces such as international trade have most likely played an important role in labour
markets for many centuries. More recently, foreign investment - and multinationals - have
become important drivers of labour market outcomes too, in particular as globalisation re-
gained momentum in the last decade of the last century. This paper investigates one aspect of
such international linkage of labour markets, namely the extent to which domestic wages are
inuenced by decisions taken by multinationals. In particular, we ask if multinational rms
share rents across borders. This aspect not only sheds light on the general functioning of
labour markets; it also studies another possible channel behind the transmission of business
cycles across countries.
Most evidence on rent sharing - supranormal prots split between employers and employ-
ees - stems from within-country studies (Abowd & Lemieux 1993, Blanchower et al. 1996,
Van Reenen 1996, Arai 2003, Martins 2009, Dobbelaere & Mairesse 2010). These studies
nd without exception that industry or rm protability increase workers' wages. However, a
recent paper (Budd et al. 2005) presents evidence that rents are also shared by multinationals
to their aliates abroad. Based on rm-level data from European multinationals and their
aliates in Europe, they nd signicant elasticities of aliate wages with respect to parents'
prots of around 0.03, even after controlling for the protability of the aliate itself.1, and
the eect of aliate wages with respect to its own prots is about 0.04.
Our paper makes three contributions to this small body of literature. First, we extend the
analysis of Budd et al. (2005) to a much wider set of countries. In particular we consider a
variety of multinational-aliate relationships, drawing on an extended version of their data
that covers 47 countries. We believe this is a more stringent test of international rent sharing
than analyses across the North American border or within Europe, given the much greater
heterogeneity in labour markets and other dimensions between, say, the U.S. and China than,
say, between Germany and France. Second, we conduct a number of new robustness tests,
including a falsication exercise that seeks to control for the role of common shocks aecting
1See also Budd & Slaughter (2004), which nds that the inuence of U.S. industry protability on Canadian
union wages depends on whether the Canadian rms have parents in the U.S. In some other papers, the
`domestic', within-country rent sharing literature also exhibits an `international avour', namely when the
exogenous variation used to identify the rent sharing eect comes from international variables, such as exchange
rates and/or international trade (Abowd & Lemieux 1993, Martins 2009).
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both the parent and its aliate. Third, we investigate some of the possible determinants of
the international rent sharing that we document, namely the role of dierent measures of the
heterogeneity (or distance) between the parent and the aliate.
Our results indicate that multinationals do share their prots with their aliates abroad,
even if the latter are located in a very dierent country. The wage elasticities we nd are always
precisely estimated and around 0.01 (from rm xed eect estimation). In some cases, namely
when using IV and GMM estimations, the elasticities are as large as 0.08, even if less precisely
estimated. We also nd that the elasticity of the aliate wage to the parent prots is higher
when aliate is located in a country with low GDP and low taxation, and interpret them
as the evidence of the transfer pricing. Further, the dierences (i.e. cultural or production)
between multinationals and their aliates increase the magnitude of the rent sharing while
the number of aliates of a multinational has the opposite eect. We believe this is consistent
with a bargaining interpretation of rent sharing but less so with fairness or risk sharing views.
Indeed, the heterogeneity between parents and aliates can be regarded as a proxy for the
complementarity between parent and aliate in terms of the global production process of the
conglomerate; and such complementarity can be assumed to increase the bargaining power of
aliates.
The next section describes the data used, after which section 3 presents the main results.
Sections 4 and 5 study the robustness of the main results and the relationship between the
heterogeneity of locations and rent sharing, respectively. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
Our analysis draws on Orbis, a data set with detailed accounting and nancial information
for the largest rms across the world. The data are collected and made available by Bureau
van Dijck, an international consultancy rm. According to Bureau van Dijck, the information
in Orbis is sourced from company reports collected by dierent providers, all of which are
nancial experts in their regions, providing detailed information, in particular about the
company nancial status.2
2Orbis also contains further detail such as news, market research, ratings and country reports, scanned
reports, ownership and mergers and acquisitions data. There is also a large number of additional reports
per company, in particular about banks, insurance and other listed companies, as well as other large private
companies. On the other hand, there is unfortunately no information on workforce human capital. See Ribeiro
et al. (2010) for more information on the Orbis data set and Bhaumik et al. (2010) and Yang & Martins (2010)
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The records of each company include information on its subsidiaries or aliates, dened
as rms where the company has an ownership stake (corresponding to a minimum 25.01%
shares control). These aliates are identied by company name and country. We are therefore
able to nd matches between multinational parents and their matched foreign aliates. As
information on the link between the aliate and the parent is only available for the last year
in which the parent appears in the data, we assume that the two rms were linked during
all years in which their information is available (Budd et al. (2005), who use the European
version of these data, Amadeus, make the same assumption). Moreover, we consider rms
that have information available on wage expenditure, prots, capital (tangible assets) and
employment levels. Firms that report missing variables in at least one of these variables are
dropped from our analysis. This criterion leads to the exclusion of several rms in some
countries, in particular Canada, Mexico and India. However, this is not a relevant problem
for the overwhelming majority of countries.
Firms that report negative net prots after taxes (4.9% of all observations) are dropped,
as we adopt a log transformation in our analysis, as in Budd et al. (2005). We also drop rms
with less than 50 employees and outliers in average wages and prots per worker.
Given the focus of the data on large companies, the data issues reported above, and the
fact that the data are relatively expensive, we were not able to obtain information about
all subsidiaries of all multinationals. However, we were still able to create a large data set,
covering a total of 2,179 multinational parents and 5,230 of their foreign subsidiaries, over the
period 1996 to 2007 (Budd et al. (2005) cover 865 multinationals and 1919 aliates). A total
of 3,274 out of our 5,230 aliates are located in dierent continents than their parents.
2.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the key summary statistics, regarding the 21,840 parent-subsidiary-year
observations in our data set (each observation corresponds to a unique parent-aliate-year
combination). As one would expect, we nd that aliates have much smaller average work-
forces (1,344 vs. 41,449 employees) and much smaller average levels of sales (e0.3 vs. e9.8
million). At the same time, these numbers indicate that our data set covers as many as 29
million workers-year in aliate rms alone. On the other hand, average prots (net prots
after taxes) per worker are similar in the two types of rms (e26,500 vs. e27,600) and average
for other papers that uses this data set.
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capital per worker is even higher in aliates than multinationals (e419,600 vs. e352,100),
even if, of course, total prots and total capital are higher in multinationals, by virtue of their
much larger size. Monetary values were converted into euros using exchange rates retrieved
from the IMF.
In terms of the time coverage of the data, it is centered around 2002, with a small standard
dispersion (2.7 years). Each parent-aliate match appears on average 4.2 times (standard
deviation of 2.6), which facilitates a longitudinal analysis and thereby controlling for time-
invariant (observed and unobserved) heterogeneity.
Aliate average wages are lower than parent average wages (e40,000 vs. e42,300). This
comparison is possibly distorted by the large number of parents for which there is no data
on average wages, even if this is not important in our main analysis as it does not require
information on parent wages. However, when considering the subset of aliates whose parents
present wage information, the average wage is approximately e38,000, which is very similar
to the previous number. As to the location variables, we nd that, for instance, 22% of the
parent-aliate pairs operate in countries that have the same main language and 11% operate
in the same two-digit industries.3
Appendix 9 presents the country distribution of rms, separately for multinational parents
and overseas subsidiaries, along with the most important variables used in our analysis, in-
cluding the average prot, capital and wage per worker. Our data cover 47 countries, including
many OECD countries and also the largest developing nations - see Figure 1. Unsurprisingly,
parents are concentrated in developed countries, with signicant numbers in Belgium, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the U.K. and the
U.S., which account for 83.3% of all parents. The majority of overseas subsidiaries are found
in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden and the U.K., which account for 88.8% of all over-
seas subsidiaries included in our data set. Unfortunately, overseas subsidiaries established
in the U.S. do not include information on wages, and therefore cannot be included in our
analysis, unlike U.S. multinationals.
To oer a better feel for the data, we present scatterplots of average wages and prots of
3If we were considering only parents and aliates based in Europe, as in Budd et al. (2005), IPR of aliate
country are similar, economic development would fall from 26,572 to 25,201 and geographic distance would
fall from 3,336 to 887 (standard deviations would also fall similarly). However, the same sector dummy would
increase from 0.11 to 0.16.
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aliates and average prots of parents by aliate country in Figure 2. The size of each circle
is proportional to the number of aliates or parents by country. The left panel indicates that
higher aliate prot is associated with larger aliate average wage. On the other hand, the
right panel (aliate wages vs. parents prots) suggests that international rent sharing may
also exist even if the relationship would be weaker than in the previous case.4
3 Results
Following Budd et al. (2005), we examine the relationship between aliate wages and multi-
national prots by estimating the following equation:
WageAit = 1Profit
P
it + 2Xit + i + t + eit; (1)
where the key variables are WageAit, the logarithm of the average wage of aliate i in year
t, and ProfitPit , the logarithm of the prot per worker of the parent of the same aliate i in
the same year t. The equation also includes other control variables (Xit), namely the prot
per worker and capital per worker of aliates and the capital per worker of parents (again
all measured in logs), and dierent combinations of xed eects, including industries (82)
and countries, and year eects (t), the latter controlling for business cycles and wage trends.
Finally, the most detailed specications also control for aliate xed eects (i). The key
parameter is 1, which indicates the elasticity of aliate wages with respect to parent prots.
Table 2 reports our rst set of estimates. Columns 1 to 3 exclude parents' characteristics
(as in `within-country' studies) while columns 4 to 6 consider parents' prots and capital level.
Profitsp, capitalp, profitsA and capitalA are not highly correlated . The correlation matrix
is available upon request. Columns 1 and 4 do not include any controls, while columns two
and ve control for aliate country and industry (two-digit classication), and year eects.
Finally, columns 3 and 6 control for aliate xed eects and year eects. From the rst three
columns, we nd that aliate prot and capital have the predicted positive eect upon aliate
wages. In particular, the aliate prot result - elasticities between 3% and 4% - suggests that
rent sharing also applies in subsidiaries of multinationals. This result is consistent with the
literature that looks at samples of (domestic- and foreign-owned) rms in a given country
4A longer version of this paper includes additional graphical evidence on the relationship between prots
and wages in our data.
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(Abowd & Lemieux 1993, Blanchower et al. 1996, Van Reenen 1996, Arai 2003, Martins
2009).
Turning to the last three columns of Table 2, we nd that parent prots also have a
positive and signicant eect upon aliate wages, even when already controlling for aliate
prots and capital (and parent capital). The elasticities range between 3% and 1% and are
always precisely estimated. The latter, smaller estimate (1%) arises in the most demanding
specication, which draws on the longitudinal variation of aliate wages and parent prots,
after controlling for year xed eects (and longitudinal variation in parent capital and aliate
prots and capital).
While the aliate xed eects used above control for time-invariant heterogeneity, it re-
mains possible that our estimates suer from a simultaneity or endogeneity bias. For instance,
parents and aliates may suer from demand shocks that occur at the same time and that
could facilitate the misleading interpretation of an eect from parent prots to aliate wages.
Alternatively, our results may be underestimated because of measurement error in the prots
variable. This would be particularly important if multinationals engage in transfer pricing, in
order to shift prots to low-tax locations.
In order to solve or at least alleviate this issue, we draw on an instrumental variables
approach, using lagged (rst and second) values of parent prots to instrument for current-
period parent prots. We therefore are assuming that lagged parent prots do not matter
in terms of current aliate wages (the exclusion restriction), while lagged parent prots will
be correlated with current parent prots (our rst stage). As before, we also control for rm
xed eects and other variables.
Table 3 reports the results, for dierent specications, namely no controls (column 1),
sector and year xed eects (column 2) and aliate and year xed eects (column 3). The
estimates of the wage-parent prot elasticities range between 5% and 8% (the upper bound
arising in the most detailed specication) and are always signicant, at least at the 10% level.
The lagged prot per worker also displays a signicant and positive eect, as expected. More-
over, the Sargan test of over-identication indicates that the instruments are valid. In column
four we used rst dierences of parent prots (current and rst lag periods) to instrument
for current period parent prots5, and we again nd the evidence that parents share prots
5We also use one and two lagged of rst dierences of parents' prots as instruments, and the results are
robust.
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internationally, which is signicant at 10% level. In each IV estimation, the Sargan test of
over-identication and tests of weak-identication and under-identication indicate that the
instruments are valid.
One could argue that our sample of aliates and parents is not representative of the coun-
try distribution of foreign direct investment in the world and this could distort our ndings.
To shed light on this matter, we rerun the models of Table 2 but now weighting each observa-
tion using alternately the levels of FDI of the parent country or of the host country (using data
from UNCTAD). This concern does not appear to be relevant given that the new estimates
- presented in Appendix 10 - are very similar. In particular, the most detailed specication
(column 6) again indicates elasticities of around 1%.
We also tested the robustness of these IV results to the consideration of host or home
country FDI weights and we found no qualitative dierences. The same applies to specica-
tions ignoring parent or aliate capital or aliate prots. In terms of our OLS results, we
also found that the results are robust to a log-level specication, that does not force us to
drop observations with negative prots. We also compared the rent sharing estimates between
manufacturing and services and found very similar results in the two cases. When comparing
the estimates between developed countries and from developed to developing economies, we
found that the latter point estimates tend to be larger, a result that we address in more detail
in Section 5. All these additional ndings are available upon request.6 We further test the
robustness of our results by using rst dierencing and GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond,
blunder and bond ), and report the results in table 4. However, linkage data employed in
this paper have gaps during the period, resulting a substantial drop of observations in these
alternative estimation techniques. We again nd the evidence that parents share prots in-
ternationally. We also report the serial correlation tests AR(1) and AR(2) in this table. P
values of Sargan test and AR(2) statistic value are both insignicant, suggesting that the
GMM estimation model is correctly specied and instruments are valid.
A useful measure of the economic eect of international rent sharing is the Lester range
(Lester 1952). This is dened as the wage increase of a worker that would move from a
`low-rent' rm to a `high-rent rm', while everything else were constant, in which `low (high)
6We are also currently working on a companion paper where we draw on matched employer-employee panel
data for one of the countries considered in the study which we then also match to information about the
parent's protability. This exercise allows one to consider human capital dierences in much greater detail,
including sources of heterogeneity such as worker-level time-invariant heterogeneity and rm-worker match
eects. However, this comes at the expense of international generality.
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rent' is dened as the rent level two standard deviations below (above) the mean. Focusing
on the last three columns of Table 2, we nd Lester ranges of 7% (in our rm xed eects
specication) to 19% (corresponding to column 4). When considering instead the IV and
GMM estimates from Tables 3 and 4, Lester ranges 9% to 51%. On average, the Lester
range in IV and GMM approach estimations is approximately 32%. This also similar to the
equivalent results obtained in Budd et al. (2005), which reports a central Lester range of 36%,
and ts to the general range of Lester range found in the rent sharing literature, which is
centred at 27%, ranging from 10% in Card et al. (2010) to 56% in Monteiro & Portela (2011)
and Martins (2009).
We further conduct a number of additional tests, which are reported in Table 5. First of
all, we consider the degree of ownership stake of the parent in its aliate, namely wholly (98%
- 100% shares), majority (50% - 97% shares) and minority (25% - 49% shares) owned by the
controlling parent. We therefore split samples into three groups: the wholly owned aliates
(column 1), the majority owned aliates (column 2), and the minority owned aliates (column
3). We nd that international rent sharing is mainly in the subsample of aliates who are
fully owned by multinational parents. This suggests that the rent sharing eect is lower for
multi-parent aliates, compared with one-parent aliate. This result is similar to the ndings
in Budd et al. (2005), which reports that rent sharing is higher for the wholly owned aliates.
Next, we re-estimate Eq. 1using prots before tax, instead of prots after tax. We report the
result in column 4, However, while this variable is not available for the full sample of rms,
they are just available for over half. Using net prot before taxes substantially reduces our
sample size, but we again nd that multinationals share prots internationally.
Further, we re-estimate the international rent sharing eect, by including a set of control
variables including cash ows, intangibles, long term debt and sales of the aliate. However,
while these are not available for the full sample of rms, they are just available for over
half. Inclusion of these variables substantially reduces our sample size, but we again nd
international rent sharing evidence (reported in column 5). In order to rule out the possibility
of multicollinearity between capital and prots, we include prots alone in column 6, and the
rent sharing eects are again evidenced. The rent sharing results are also robust when we use
one lag of prots in column 7. Finally, as described in the summary statistics section, parents
that report negative prots (4.9% of all observations from 406 rms) are dropped, as we adopt
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a log transformation of prots in our analysis, as in Budd et al., (2005). We include rms who
report negative prots, and re-ran the estimation using levels instead of a log transformation
of variables, and report estimates in column 8 of table 5. We nd that parents share prots
internationally. Further, we examine the rent sharing evidence for a subsample of rms who
report negative values, while the eect became insignicant (reported in column 9 of table 5).
4 Further robustness
4.1 Aliate-to-parent rent sharing?
Our rst robustness test involves examining if there are rent-sharing eects when considering
again the relationship between parents and aliates but from the opposite direction, i.e. if
aliates share rents with parents' employees. Given the much larger size of multinational
parents when compared to aliates (as indicated in Section 2.1), we would nd it surprising
if such aliate-to-parent rent sharing also occurred. Furthermore, such a result could cast
doubts on our interpretation of the main results, as it could suggest that the parent-to-aliate
rent sharing arose out of common shocks to the two rms rather than a genuine outcome of
bargaining or risk-sharing mechanisms.
We test this hypothesis drawing on a modied version of equation 2:
WagePit = 1Profit
A
it + Xit + i + t + eit; (2)
whereWagePit is the log of the average wage of multinational parent i in year t and Profit
A
it
refers to the log of the prot of the aliate over the same period. The equation also includes
other control variables, including the prot and the capital of the parent and the capital of
aliate (Xit), parent industry, country or rm xed eects (i) and year eects (t). The
key parameter is 1, which indicates the elasticity of parent wages to aliate prots.
Table 6 presents the results, following a similar structure to Table 2. Columns 1 to 3, which
ignore aliate variables, indicate that rent sharing is present at the multinational (parent)
level - a result that is similar to the one obtained when considering the role of aliate prots
on aliate wages. On the other hand, the symmetry with previous ndings is shown to come
to an end when we consider the role of aliate prots on parent wages (columns 4 to 6): except
for the simplest specication (column 4), the other results indicate no signicant evidence of
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rent sharing from aliates to their parents. Estimates from OLS estimation produce biased
results, compared with the most detailed specication of rm xed eect estimation (column
6), because OLS estimation does not control for the rm invariant factors. Therefore, our
main focus in Table 6 is estimates from rm xed eect regressions. As before, we nd that
these results are robust (i.e. still insignicant) to dierent weightings. One may argue that
columns 1 to 6 results gave more weight to multi-aliate parents. In order to avoid to give
more weight to multi-aliate parents, we re-estimate the rent sharing eect by adding the
weight that is inversely proportional to the number of aliates for each parent. Further, we
average the total prots and capital of the aliates who share the same parent, and re-ran
our estimation. We still nd results are robust, and there is no evidence of rent sharing from
aliates to their parents. We report these results in columns 7-8 of Table 6.
We also conducted another test following a similar approach, in which we examine the
relationship between the employment levels of aliates and the prots of their parents. If
increasing parents' prots lead to the expansion of the size of the aliates, then the average
aliate wage could increase if marginal workers demand higher individual wages, and not
because of rent sharing. However, we could not nd any systematic link between parent's
prots and aliate size. These results are available upon request.
4.2 Falsication test
As mentioned before, one concern about our preferred interpretation of the international rent
sharing results is that it may arise out of shocks that simultaneously hit the protability of
parents and the wage levels of aliates. For instance, a worldwide increase in the demand for
a given product could presumably raise the prots of a multinational that operates in that
industry while, at the same time, that shock will also raise the labour demand - and therefore
the wages - of workers of an aliate of that same multinational based in a dierent country.
Even if this alternative explanation is less likely to apply in the context of our more diverse
set of multinationals and aliates, compared to Budd et al. (2005), this correlation could
be strong enough to survive the controls we consider, leading us to incorrectly interpret our
results as rent sharing.
In order to provide additional evidence on this issue, on top of the IV and aliate-to-
parent analyses presented before, here we conduct the following falsication test: we match
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parents to other parents that are very similar in a number of characteristics (as available in our
data set), in the spirit of a propensity score matching analysis (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983).
Furthermore, we also require that each parent and its match (another parent) are located in
the same industry and in the same country (i.e. we exact match on these two variables).7 We
then take the prot information of this `matched parent' and use that in the regression in the
place of the prot information of the true parent. Finally, we rerun our previous estimations,
based again on the benchmark specication of equation 1.
The idea is to select information from parent rms that are very similar and therefore
would be subject to the same shocks as the matched counterpart. If this exercise results
in similar or at least signicant estimates of `rent sharing', then we would have to at least
revisit our interpretation of our previous estimates (such as those of Table 2). On the other
hand, if this exercise results in insignicant estimates, then that would be consistent with our
preferred interpretation of rent sharing.
The range of variables initially available for the matching exercise is reasonably large (em-
ployment, sales, capital, age, number of aliates, year), and certainly at least comparable
to ranges adopted in other empirical papers. In any case, we also consider several transfor-
mations of these variables (squares, cubes, interactions of two and three variables) in order
to obtain a more precise correspondence between the two matched parents, at least along
observable dimensions, in the spirit of a propensity score matching exercise. As mentioned
above, we also require that, for each aliate, the matched parent is in the same industry and
country as the original, true parent. To provide more robustness, we also obtain results when
we match on the parents' prots on top of the remaining variables.
As to the matching process itself, we start by pooling all parents and aliates and then
estimate a logit model where the dependent variable is a parent dummy and the regressors
are the variables and polynomials described above. Using these coecients, we compute the
probability that each parent is in fact a parent (the alternative being an aliate). In the
last step of this analysis, we nd which parent is the best match for each other parent by
comparing their probabilities of `parenthood', as in the nearest neighbour algorithm.
Appendix 11 presents descriptive statistics on the quality of the match obtained. These
variables are measured in ratios as those of the employment ows literature, which are bound
between -2 and +2 (i.e. we divide the dierence of the two gures by the mean of the same
7Ideally, we would be matching Coca-cola and Pepsi or HP and Dell, for instance.
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two gures). The results indicate a very good quality in the matching, as the average ratios
are always low - even if the standard deviations are relatively high. Furthermore, we nd
that matching also on prots does not change the results, in particular it does not lead to a
sizable deterioration of the quality of matching, which is further evidence that our matched
parents are similar to the original parents. The absence of major dierences to the quality of
matching when prots are added is driven by the very large number of variables used in the
matching process (more than 60 variables).
The regression results - presented in Table 7 - are again based on dierent versions of
equation 1. Moreover, the rst set of estimates (columns 1 to 3) weights each observation
inversely to the absolute dierence in the propensity score of the parent and its match. In
other words, these results attach greater importance to parents that are better matched. The
top panel, where prots are ignored as a matching variable, indicate evidence of spurious
rent sharing only when not controlling for any covariates (columns 1 and 4). In the remain-
ing columns, all `parent' prots estimates are insignicant. Some point estimates are even
negative. The bottom panel exhibits greater resilience of the spurious rent sharing eects,
as expected: even the columns with industry and country xed eects return signicantly
positive coecients. However, when adding aliate xed eects (columns 3 and 6), the co-
ecients again lose signicance and the point estimates are virtually zero. Furthermore, we
require each match to be in the same year and same three digit sector (column 7)8, and use
three nearest neighbour to nd matches (column8), instead of one nearest neighbour. The
results are robust (still insignicant). We require the matches to be in the same year and
the same 3-digit sector, and we nd the results are robust. Further, results are again robust
when matches are found by the three-nearest neighbours. We report them in columns 7 and
8 of table 7. Using three-nearest neighbour method, in column 8 we nd that the number of
matches is the same in panels A and B. We take the results from this novel test as important
evidence against a spurious relationship between parent prots and aliate wages and in a
favour of a causal interpretation of our ndings.
8We further require each match to be in the same four digit sector, and the results are robust.
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5 Extensions
Having provided considerable evidence of a causal interpretation of our estimates, we now
turn to the t between our results and the theoretical motivation presented above, which
was based on transfer pricing, bargaining and risk sharing mechanisms. We test this t by
making the argument that, if the rent sharing eect is higher when the aliate is located in a
country with low economic development, low taxation, low IPR and technological capability.
We also argue that bargaining and/or risk sharing do in fact drive the rent sharing results
presented in the paper, then the dierences between the parent and the aliate may be an
important parameter aecting the magnitude of the eect. For instance, if the parent and the
aliate are located in nearby or even adjacent countries, then it is less likely that they will
be subject to dierent shocks that would warrant a risk sharing mechanism. Furthermore, if
the parent and aliate are located far away from each other, then it may be more likely that
the type of foreign investment that occurred there is of a vertical nature (Carr et al. 2001),
if the multinational is slicing its production chain to explore the location advantages of the
aliate country. In that case, this will have implications in terms of a stronger bargaining
power of the aliate, as the scope of hold-up and of disruption of the international production
ow would increase. However, in the case of horizontal investment, a threat by an aliate
to stop or disrupt production would have much smaller knock-on consequences in terms of
the multinational production process, even in a period of increasing prots, given its weaker
complementarity with the parent. In this case, the scope for wage increases would be small.
These mechanisms are also consistent with evidence that multinationals take into account
local market conditions when setting up foreign operations, for instance by focusing aliates
on processing imported inputs (vertical investment) in countries with lower wages and trade
costs and smaller markets (Hanson et al. 2005). As the latter type of countries will be
found mostly in developing countries, while multinationals typically have their headquarters
in developed economies, then, if rent sharing is relevant, the wages of aliates in developing
countries will be more closely tied to the circumstances of headquarters than the wages of
aliates in developed economies. This may be particularly important in a context of contract
incompleteness (Ottaviano & Turrini 2007).
In our empirical analysis of this issue, we take a broad approach to the concept of aliate
locational factors. In particular, we consider economic, technological, IPR taxation, trade
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unions density measures. We consider linguistic and geographical distance between the aliate
and parent. We also consider a variable that seeks to capture the complementarity of the two
types of rms more directly - a dummy variable equal to one if the two rms operate in
the same industry. However, even such a measure does not capture the concept that we are
examining, as dierences within a two-digit industry classication may already be enough to
generate important complementarity issues.
More specically, the list of location variables that we use in this extension is as follows:
1. Economic development: the GDP per capita of the country where the aliate is located,
using GDP data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011).
2. Intellectual property rights (IPR): the Park (2008) IPR index for aliate country. Given
the data available (2000 and 2005 only), we use the 2000 IPR index for the years
corresponding to 1997-2000 and the 2005 IPR index for the years corresponding to
2001-2007.
3. Technology: dierence in the share of resident patent applications in the total number
of applications, as available from the World Bank indicators, given that patent data are
often used as a measure of technological capability (Griliches 1990).
4. Taxation: the taxation level on income, prots and capital gains (% of revenue) of the
country where the aliate is located, using the from the World Development Indicators
(World Bank 2011).
5. Trade union density: the level of trade union density of the country where the aliate
is located, using trade union density data from the OECD (2013).
6. Language: dummy variable equal to one if the two countries have the same ocial
language and zero otherwise.
7. Geography: distance (log kilometres) between the capital cities of parent and aliate
country, following the `great circle formula', as available from the CEPII Distances
dataset.
8. Industry: dummy variable equal to one, if the two rms are in the same two-digit
industry, or zero, otherwise.
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We estimate the eects of location of the aliate on rent sharing by adding each variable
and its interaction with the aliate prots variable in equation 3:
WageAit = 1Profit
P
it + 2Locationit + 3Profit
P
it  Locationit + Xit + i + t + eit; (3)
All variables have the same interpretation as before, while Locationit corresponds to each
one of the six heterogeneity variables we consider and ProfitPit Locationit is the interaction
term of interest. However, in order to compare the eects of each heterogeneity variable, we
standardise them. Specically, we subtract the mean of the variable across all observations
used and then divide that dierence by the standard deviation of the variable again obtained
across all observations considered.
The results9 are presented in Tables 8. First of all, we nd that the locational variables
have the predicted eect on aliate wages. Regardless of the table, aliate wages are higher
when aliates are in high IPR, technology, economic development, taxation country. The
same applies to language (positive coecient if the language is the same), while the `same
sector' status is associated with smaller average wages. Turning now to the key results, those
of the interaction terms, three of the ve coecients are signicant in columns 1-5 of while
three are signicant in column 6-8 of Table 8. We nd that the elasticity of the aliate wage
to the parent prots is higher when the aliate is located in a country with lower GDP and
low taxation, and interpret them as the evidence of transfer pricing. Further, we also nd the
trade unions density increases the rent sharing eect.
Next, we examine the role of bargaining and the risk sharing on the international rent
sharing in columns 6-10. Rent sharing is weaker between rms in countries that share the
same language. The magnitude of the eects is also similar across measures.10. The only
exception in columns 6-10 to this pattern concerns geographic distance, whose coecient is
insignicant in both tables. This result is consistent with one of the robustness tests presented
in Budd et al. (2005), who also interacted prots with geographic distance. They justify this
analysis arguing that rent sharing could be determined by information ows, and the latter
could be proxied by physical location. However, they found \no substantial variation in prot
9Results based on weights by parent country FDI and host country FDI are very similar and available upon
request.
10We also found that rent sharing increases with the dierence in the level of `intangible capital' between
the parent and the aliate. However, we have not been able to obtain a good denition of the measurement
of such capital in our data.
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sharing from distance" (p. 81). In our view, one could argue instead that geographic distance
is a poor proxy for the idea of complementarity between locations as a determinant of rent
sharing that motivates our analysis.
Overall, these results may also be consistent with recent ndings based on matched rm-
worker longitudinal data that the wage premium of foreign-owned rms with respect to do-
mestic rms is decreasing in the level of development of the host country (Hijzen et al. 2010).11
If foreign-owned rms in developing countries benet from high levels of rent sharing (as pre-
dicted from our distance results), then rent sharing would create a wedge, on average, between
the pay levels of the two types of rms. This would still be the case even if base wages were
initially set at similar levels to those of domestic rms in those countries. A similar wedge
would not arise, at least not to the same extent, between domestic and foreign rms in de-
veloped countries given the smaller levels of heterogeneity, on average, with respect to the
parent countries of the latter.
We investigate a little deeper the bargaining interpretation of our results by considering
a new interaction: the number of aliates of each parent. The motivation is that, if a parent
has many aliates, it will be more dicult for any one of them to extract wage concessions
from the parent through rent sharing. All being the same, an aliate of a parent company
with a large total number of aliates would have weaker bargaining power as it would not
be able to threaten to disrupt the operation of the parent to the same extent as an aliate
of a smaller parent (with fewer aliates). In the former case, a multinational could relocate
production across the world (`footloose multinationals') and even play aliates one against
the other.
In terms of the descriptive statistics, we do nd considerable levels and dispersion of the
number of parent aliates across aliates: 196 on average and a standard deviation of 191 (see
Table 1). These numbers are quite large as they draw together home and overseas aliates,
including foreign aliates not picked up in our data set but that are owned by a parent. The
statistics are also computed across aliates, which will give greater weight to large parents.
Moreover, the results in Tables 8 indicate clearly that rent sharing falls with the number of
aliates: the point estimates of the interaction coecients are -0.011 (columns 9). Finally, we
nd the rent sharing eect is greater when aliates are larger, We nd that the rent sharing
11In current work in progress, we also nd considerable evidence, drawing on a similar data set to the one
used in this paper, of a negative relationship between economic development and wage dierentials between
domestic and foreign rms (Martins & Yang 2011).
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is greater when the aliate represents a larger share in its parents employees, measured by
the ratio of number of employees in the aliate to total employees of its parent. We take
these results as additional evidence that bargaining mechanisms drive the rent sharing eects
that we document, rather than risk sharing of fairness considerations.12
6 Conclusions
The paper examined the extent to which multinationals share their rents across aliates lo-
cated abroad in terms of higher aliate wages, considering a wide variety of home and host
countries. This is an important question to understand the sensitivity of domestic labour
markets to economic conditions abroad and the mechanisms behind the international trans-
mission of shocks. Until now, this issue had been examined only in Budd et al. (2005), who
draw on 1990s data of multinationals and aliates based in Europe.
Here we draw on rm-level panel data that is similar to the one used in that paper except
that it covers a larger and more heterogeneous range of parent-aliate pairs. Many of these
parent-aliate pairs are located in dierent continents and in very dierent country settings,
along several dimensions. We can therefore not only assess the generality of the international
rent-sharing phenomenon but also understand some of its determinants, namely in terms of
the contrast between the locations of the parent and aliate rms, with a view to clarifying
its theoretical mechanisms.
First, we nd that the earlier results for multinationals and aliates both located in
Europe (Budd et al. 2005) also hold when considering a wide set of both parent and aliate
locations. We obtained elasticities of average aliate wages with respect to parent prots of
1% to 8%, the latter case when considering instrumental variables.
Second, we obtain evidence that such a positive relationship is particularly robust and con-
sistent with a causal interpretation. For instance, aliate prots do not seem to aect parent
wages. This is as one would expect given the smaller size of aliates - but not necessarily if
a third, unobservable variable were driving both prots and wages of the two types of rms,
such as common shocks to parents' prots and aliate's wages. More important, our falsi-
cation exercise, based on considering the prots of similar parents, resulted in insignicant
12We also discussed this paper with two senior human resource managers from two large multinationals
(based in the consultancy and pharmaceuticals sectors), who nd our results and the bargaining interpretation
consistent with their personal experiences.
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estimates.
Third, when examining the determinants of international rent sharing, we nd that lo-
cation (regardless of its specic denition - economic, cultural, technological, trade unions
density, and taxation) tends to inuence rent-sharing eects. On the other hand, the number
of aliates reduced rent sharing. We argue that this result supports the view that rent shar-
ing is driven by bargaining considerations. Indeed, such heterogeneity can be regarded as a
proxy for complementarities in production (vertical foreign investment), which would create
bargaining opportunities.
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Figures
Figure 1: Country coverage
Notes: There are four groups of countries, depending on the type of information available in our data set:
countries for which we have both parent and aliate information (in black), only parent information (dark
grey), only aliate information (light grey), no information (white). The rst three categories include 47
countries.
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Notes: The left gure is the relationship between aliate prot (average) and aliate wage (average), by
country in the year of 2005. Countries with more than 10 rms are left in this gure. The right gure is the
relationship between parent prot (average) and aliate wage (average), by country. Size of circle is propor-
tional to the weight of GDP per capita of 2005 by country. Weight is used from world development indicator.
The label in the circle is the country ISO code. Countries included in this gure are Australia (AUS), Austria
(AUT), Belgium (BEL), Bulgaria (BGR), Brazil (BRA), Switzerland (CHE), China (CHN), the Czech Repub-
lic (CZE), Germany (DEU), Denmark (DNK), Spain (ESP), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA),
the U.K. (GBR), Greece (GRC), Hong Kong (HKG), Hungary (HUN), Indonesia (IDN), Indian (IND), Ireland
(IRL), Iceland (ISL), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), South Korea (KOR), Liechtenstein (LIE), Lithuania (LTU),
Luxembourg (LUX), Latvia (LVA), Malaysia (MYS), the Netherlands (NLD), Norway (NOR), Philippines
(PHL), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Romania (ROU), Russia (RUS), Singapore (SGP), Slovenia (SVN),
Sweden (SWE), Thailand (THA), Taiwan (TWN), and South Africa (ZAF). Taiwan is not included in the




Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Firm characteristics
Aliates
Average wage per worker 40.0 20.6 21840
Prot per worker 26.5 41.1 21840
Capital per worker 419.6 13487.6 21840
Employment 1344.8 4788.7 21840
Turnover 347337.9 1006446 21821
Parents
Average wage per worker 42.3 32.9 12612
Prot per worker 27.6 42.8 21840
Capital per worker 352.1 804.4 21840
Employment 41449.3 69625.7 21840
Turnover 9826596 2.19e+07 21838
Survey Year 2002.3 2.7 21840
Location variables
IPR 4.51 0.26 21307
Technology capability 0.66 0.22 12173
Economic development 26572.75 11323.90 21697
Tax rate 27.96 8.59 21061
Trade Unions Density 30.58 20.04 20809
Common language 0.22 0.41 21697
Geographic 3336.27 3320.18 21697
Same sector 0.11 0.31 21840
Number of aliates 159.15 180.72 21840
Employees ratio (aliate/parent) 0.47 5.407911 21840
Notes: All monetary variables are in thousands of euros. `Prot per worker, parents (aliates)' is prot per worker of
the multinational parents (aliates). `Capital per worker, parents (aliates)' is capital per worker of the multinational
parents (aliates). `Employment, parents (aliates)' is number of employees of multinational parents (aliates). `Sales,
parents (aliates)' is total sales of the multinational parents (aliates). `Average wage, parents (aliates)' is average
wage per worker of the multinational parents (aliates). `IPR` is the IPR index in Park (2008) of the aliate country.
`Technology capability' is the technology capability of the aliate country (share of resident patent applications in the
total number of applications.). `Economic development` is the GDP per capita of the aliate country. `Taxation' is the
taxation level on prot, income and revenue of country where the aliate is located, using the taxation data from the
World Development Indicators (World Bank 2011). `Trade union' is the level of trade unions density of the country where
the aliate is located, using trade union density data from OECD (2013). `Same language' is equal to one if the parent
and aliate country have common ocial of primary language, otherwise is zero. `Geographic distance' is simple distance
between capitals of the parent and aliate country. `Same sector' if the rms operate in the same two-digit industry.
`Employees ratio (aliate/parent) is the ratio of number of employees in the aliate to total employees of its parent.
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Table 2: Main rent sharing results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prot, parents .030 .016 .011
(.005) (.003) (.003)
Capital, parents -.089 .012 .091
(.007) (.004) (.009)
Prot, aliates .027 .041 .035 .024 .039 .034
(.004) (.003) (.003) (.004) (.003) (.003)
Capital, aliates .405 .177 .308 .429 .171 .292
(.007) (.005) (.012) (.007) (.005) (.012)
Obs. 21840 21840 21840 21840 21840 21840
F statistic 2933.652 246.219 533.601 1501.145 245.621 352.496
R2 .352 .783 .939 .358 .784 .94
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker of multinational aliates. All explanatory variables
are in logs. Columns 2 and 5 include country, sector and year eects, while columns 3 and 6 include aliate rm
xed eects and year xed eects. `Prot, aliates (parents)' is prot per worker of the multinational aliates
(parents). `Capital, aliates (parents)' is capital per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). Val-
ues in parentheses are standard errors. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
25
Table 3: Rent sharing: IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prot, parent .078 .053 .083 .014
(.010) (.007) (.049) (.007)
Capital, parent -.096 -.012 -.083 .074
(.011) (.007) (.038) (.016)
Prot, aliate .012 .041 .027 .038
(.006) (.004) (.006) (.006)
Capital, aliate .383 .187 .280 .335
(.007) (.005) (.035) (.033)
Obs. 10819 10819 9956 9560
F statistic 1572.406 266.736 185.254 93.753
R2 .368 .755 .351 .313
First-stage results
Prot per worker, parents (1st lag) .569 .550 .133
(.009) (.009) (.024)
Prot per worker, parents (2nd lag) .120 .122 -.088
(.009) (.009) (.021)
First dierences of parents' prots .613
(.011)
First dierences of parents' prots (1st lag) .360
(.010)
Underidentication test 4855.479 4612.295 37.044 723.901
Chi-sq(2) P-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Weak identication test 4401.955 3973.064 21.722 1626.772
Stock-Yogo 10% maximal IV size 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93
Hansen J statistic 1.714 .001 .379 .03
Chi-sq(1) p-value .19 .974 .538 .863
Notes: Dependent variable: log wage per worker of aliate. All explanatory variables are in logarithms.
Values in parentheses are robust standard errors. `Prot, parents' is prot per worker of the multinational
parents. `Capital, parents' is capital per worker of the multinational parents. `Prot, aliates' is prot
per worker of the multinational aliates. `Capital, aliates' is capital per worker of the multinational
aliates. `L. Prot, parent', `L2. Prot, parent' `First dierences of parents prots', and `L. rst dierences
of parents prots' are used as instruments for current-period parent prot. `L. Prot, parents' is prot
per worker of the multinational parents at one year before, and `L2. Prot, parents' refers to prot per
worker of the multinational parents at two years before. `First dierences of parents prots' is the rst
dierence of prot per worker of the multinational parents, and `First dierences of parents prots' is the
rst dierence of prot per worker of the multinational parents at one year before. Column 1 does not
control for any xed eect, and column 2 controls for country, sector and year xed eects. and columns
3 and 4 controls for aliate rm xed eect and year xed eect. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 4: Rent results - Year st-dierencing and GMM
(FD) (GMM-AB) (GMM-BB)
Prot, parents .005 .018 .015
(.003) (.006) (.003)
Capital, parents -.040 .078 -.026
(.008) (.020) (.006)
Prot, aliates .012 .041 .007
(.002) (.005) (.003)
Capital, aliates .218 .523 .107
(.009) (.021) (.012)
Obs. 12859 9111 9111
AR (1) -6.5708 -4.01
AR (1)-P value 0.0000 0.000
AR (2) 1.2629 1.02
AR (2)-P value 0.2066 0.308
Sargan test (P value) 0.5067 0.422
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker of multinational aliates. All explanatory variables
are in logs. `Prot, aliates (parents)' is prot per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). `Capital,
aliates (parents)' is capital per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). `FD' is rst dierencing
estimate. `GMM-AB' is GMM Arellano and Bond estimation. `GMM-BB' is GMM blunder and bond
estimation. Values in parentheses are standard errors. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10;
**: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 5: Rent results: additional test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ProfitP .012 .007 .004 .007 .031
(.005) (.006) (.004) (.003) (.003)
ProfitBP .033
(.004)
CapitalP .092 .195 .002 .088 .082 .100
(.011) (.021) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.011)
ProfitA .038 .027 .025 .031 .011 .067
(.004) (.005) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.002)
CapitalA .243 .288 .244 .321 .267 .317













ProfitP (L) .006 -.009
(.002) (.113)






Obs. 8054 3983 9803 12032 14342 21840 14401 22965 1125
F statistic 367.376 176.288 251.848 692.014 405.507 495.841 150.175 572.642 13.5
R2 .927 .926 .957 .941 .942 .928 .952 .93 .981
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker of multinational aliates. Explanatory variables
(apart from ProfitP (L), CapitalP (L), ProfitA(L) and CapitalA(L))are in logs. All Columns include
aliate rm xed eects and year xed eects. Column 1 includes only wholly owned aliates, Column 2
includes only majority owned aliates, and Column 3 includes only minority owned aliates. Column 8
include parents who report both positive and negative prots. Column 9 only include parents with negative
prots. `Prot, aliates (parents)' is prot after taxes per worker of the multinational aliates (parents).
`Capital, aliates (parents)' is capital per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). ProfitBP is
prot before taxes per worker of the multinational parents. `DebtA' is long term debt of the aliate.
`CashF lowA' is the cash ows of the aliate, `IntangiblesA' is intanbiles of the aliate, `EmployeesA'
is the total number of employees of the aliate. Lag.ProfitP is one lag of prot per worker of the
multinational parents. `Lag.ProfitA' is one lag of prot per worker of the multinational aliates. Val-
ues in parentheses are standard errors. Robust standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 6: Rent sharing: aliate prots on parent wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ProfitA .016 .002 -.0007 .0005
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.002)
CapitalP .003 .006 -.0006 -.004





ProfitP .0003 .030 .035 -.004 .029 .035 .041 .035
(.005) (.004) (.004) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.004)
CapitalP .305 .302 .343 .301 .299 .343 .354 .343
(.007) (.005) (.008) (.007) (.006) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Obs. 12612 12612 12612 12612 12612 12612 12612 12612
F statistic 1693.842 121.773 326.755 896.521 119.195 285.883 311.251 285.869
R2 .308 .547 .864 .31 .547 .864 .883 .864
Notes: Dependent variable for each regression is wage per worker of multinational parents in all columns.
Second and fth columns above include country, sector and year xed eects, while third, sixth, seven
and eight columns above include a full set of xed eects, include parent rm xed eect and year xed
eect. Values in parentheses are standard errors. `Prot, parents' is prot per worker of the multinational
parents. `Capital, parents' is capital per worker of the multinational parents. Column 7 adds the weight
that is inversely proportional to the number of aliates for each parent. ProfitavgA and CapitalavgA are
the average prots and capital of the aliates who share the same parent, respectively. `Prot, aliates' is
prot per worker of the multinational aliates. `Capital, aliates' is capital per worker of the multinational
aliates. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 7: Falsication test: Rent sharing based on `matched parents'
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
tPanel A: benchmark
Prot, 'parents' .019 .004 -.009 .021 .004 -.008 -.007 -.004
(.009) (.005) (.007) (.009) (.005) (.007) (.008) (.004)
Capital, 'parents' -.079 -.025 -.005 -.079 -.025 -.011 -.032 .004
(.011) (.007) (.014) (.011) (.007) (.015) (.030) (.006)
Prot, aliates .018 .035 .037 .016 .035 .037 .038 .046
(.007) (.004) (.005) (.007) (.004) (.005) (.010) (.007)
Capital, aliates .426 .205 .358 .425 .204 .347 .443 .430
(.010) (.006) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.011) (.078) (.053)
Obs. 8994 8994 8994 8994 8994 8994 6131 12570
No. Parents 1179 1179 1179 1179 1179 1179 681 681
No. aliates 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 1747 1787
F statistic 633.731 52.753 193.646 642.059 51.727 184.758 77.155 168.301
R2 .357 .766 .927 .352 .764 .925 .898 .896
Panel B: matching also on prots
Prot, 'parents' .029 .016 -.003 .032 .017 -.001 -.007 -.004
(.009) (.005) (.007) (.009) (.005) (.007) (.008) (.004)
Capital, 'parents' -.094 -.035 -.001 -.092 -.034 -.006 -.032 .004
(.011) (.007) (.015) (.012) (.007) (.015) (.030) (.006)
Prot, aliates .015 .035 .037 .014 .035 .037 .038 .046
(.007) (.004) (.005) (.007) (.004) (.005) (.010) (.007)
Capital, aliates .428 .206 .357 .427 .205 .343 .443 .430
(.010) (.006) (.011) (.010) (.006) (.011) (.078) (.053)
Obs. 8964 8964 8964 8964 8964 8964 6131 12570
No. Parents 1188 1188 1188 1188 1188 1188 681 681
No. aliates 2831 2831 2831 2831 2831 2831 1747 1787
F statistic 623.711 53.323 191.2 636.627 52.268 180.511 77.155 168.301
R2 .355 .769 .927 .351 .768 .926 .898 .896
Notes: Dependent variable: log of wage per worker in each aliate. Columns 1-3 impose weights (inverse of
the absolute dierence in the propensity scores of the true and matched parent). Columns 2 and 5 include
country, sector and year eects. Columns 3, 6, 7 and 8 include aliate rm xed eects and year xed eects.
`Prot, aliates (parents)' is prot per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). `Capital, aliates
(parents)' is capital per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). Column 7 requires each match to be
in the same year and the same three digit sector. Column 8 contains matches from three nearest neighbour
methods. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 8: Eects of location on rent sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ProfitP  IPR .0009
(.004)
ProfitP  Technology -.007
(.006)
ProfitP  Economic -.038
(.004)
ProfitP  Taxation -.029
(.005)












Prot, aliates .054 .038 .047 .041 .055
(.004) (.009) (.005) (.006) (.004)
Capital, aliates .387 .507 .407 .479 .328
(.008) (.010) (.006) (.007) (.008)
Prot, parents .018 .018 -.003 .013 .016
(.004) (.012) (.007) (.008) (.004)
Capital, parents .102 .069 .006 -.002 .056
(.008) (.021) (.014) (.016) (.008)
Obs. 21307 12173 21697 21061 20809
F statistic 816.8 1057.403 1340.657 546.014 981.818
R2 .938 .738 .781 .685 .925
Notes: Dependent variable: log of wage per worker in each aliate. All rm characteristics variables are in
logarithms. Values in parentheses are standard errors. See the notes to Table 1 for more details. Signicance
levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 8 (continued): Eects of location on rent sharing
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)




















Prot, aliates .042 .040 .036 .068 .037
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.004) (.006)
Capital, aliates .564 .565 .595 .236 .569
(.007) (.007) (.008) (.005) (.007)
Prot, parents .028 .029 .029 .023 .029
(.008) (.008) (.009) (.004) (.008)
Capital, parents .069 .075 .055 .014 .066
(.015) (.015) (.017) (.005) (.015)
Obs. 21697 21697 21840 21840 21840
F statistic 1601.562 1689.323 1358.603 558.213 1565.803
R2 .681 .687 .688 .784 .68
Notes: Dependent variable: log of wage per worker in each aliate. All specications control for parent rm
xed eect and year xed eects. See notes to Table 8 for more details. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05;
***: 0.01.
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Table 9: Appendix A: Number of rms and key variables per country
Aliates Parents
Country N. Prot Capital Wage N. Prot Capital Wage
Australia 20 29.43 309.53 24.17 20 36.74 907.51 32.38
Austria 47 16.94 289.34 45.15 28 21.72 257.57 46.78
Belgium 279 32.44 1822.3 56.08 97 23.24 545.01 49.84
Brazil 5 46.38 614.06 6.53 0
Bulgaria 35 6.03 64.73 4.68 0
Canada 0 3 94.13 1231.48
China 15 16.72 215.44 4.75 2 2.28 53.83
Czech Republic 194 15.55 112.73 11.18 2 16.13 266.2 11.11
Denmark 178 21.82 248.02 45.68 78 21.65 251.09 40.48
Estonia 97 6.79 56.23 8.5 0
Finland 132 28.96 226.93 43.68 85 20.75 257.06 38.07
France 900 25.1 311.08 49.53 142 31.5 669.78 52.75
Germany 381 31.35 356.98 58.45 154 22.88 257.96 47.7
Greece 2 14.45 189.17 24.83 15 23.51 237.08 34.39
Hong Kong 4 18.36 338.67 9.43 2 15.81 142.52 9.03
Hungary 39 12.98 138.18 16.98 4 16.99 141.38 11.53
Iceland 2 89.11 512.57 52.96 5 5.96 224.85 32.99
India 15 5.69 54.83 4.18 0
Indonesia 11 8.47 55.54 3.66 0
Ireland 5 99.97 543.68 37.82 21 32.14 309.38 36.93
Italy 467 27.97 374.96 43.5 112 24.92 374.36 41.92
Japan 13 41.83 304.91 43.38 161 25.77 542.1 40.6
Latvia 5 4.47 61.79 8.74 0
Liechtenstein 1 4.28 52.7 33.79 1 9.85 120.43 42.58
Lithuania 1 3.39 71.45 5.77 2 0.36 22.19
Luxembourg 21 26.72 748.2 39.23 10 36.38 1050.83 53.1
Malaysia 23 15.58 142.34 10.06 8 21.48 299.58 8.42
Mexico 0 1 41.55 455.3
Netherland 201 48.35 697.49 51.52 203 20.28 373.69 45.07
Norway 149 23.76 202.99 46.24 38 45.65 425.59 49.61
Philippines 5 13.67 125.74 4.47 0
Poland 193 17.09 149.7 11.48 7 17.42 361.04 28.56
Portugal 84 27 261.2 26.42 11 25.67 368.61 24.02
Romania 130 10.15 71.01 5.59 1 0.78 145.57 11.97
Russia 1 23.62 101.4 10.56 5 13.53 86.7 6.17
Singapore 20 11.99 166.86 13.62 15 21.87 363.25 19.4
Slovenia 9 21.56 256.06 24.75 2 12.14 97.83 14.77
South Africa 6 10.55 83.55 10.25 8 11.48 185.8 27.37
South Korea 33 47.55 292.95 15.54 2 58.67 304.97
Spain 249 34.05 377.97 42.05 66 44.14 501.96 39.21
Sweden 208 26.53 293.03 29.75 144 22.08 252.44 138.79
Switzerland 20 30.42 332.28 49.42 70 19.7 226.33 39.84
Taiwan 16 24.62 197.4 13.84 10 12.68 357.12 14.95
Thailand 30 11.97 125.96 4.99 2 7.2 135.46 3.72
Turkey 0 3 48.57 263.8 5.44
UK 984 25.62 344.52 38.27 182 22.52 331.8 41.37
US 0 457 24.38 243.27
Notes: 2,179 multinational parents and 5,230 overseas aliates. `Prot' (`Capital', `Wage') refers to
average prots (capital, wages) per worker. All monetary variables in thousands of euros.33
Table 10: Appendix B: Rent sharing - weights based on parent or host country FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Weights based on host country FDI
Prot, parents .040 .023 .011
(.006) (.003) (.003)
Capital, parents -.060 .026 .120
(.008) (.004) (.007)
Prot, aliates .026 .045 .035 .022 .042 .033
(.005) (.002) (.002) (.005) (.002) (.002)
Capital, aliates .380 .167 .302 .391 .155 .281
(.009) (.004) (.006) (.010) (.004) (.006)
Obs. 21809 21809 21809 21809 21809 21809
F statistic 1496.661 141.465 2015.893 769.95 142.326 1122.261
R2 .328 .75 .929 .332 .753 .93
Weights based on parent country FDI
Prot, parents .026 .016 .014
(.005) (.003) (.003)
Capital, parents -.047 .019 .091
(.007) (.004) (.006)
Prot, aliates .026 .036 .030 .023 .033 .029
(.004) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.002)
Capital, aliates .330 .172 .280 .341 .163 .264
(.006) (.003) (.005) (.007) (.003) (.005)
Obs. 21756 21756 21756 21756 21756 21756
F statistic 2429.61 148.253 1962.027 1237.335 147.467 1085.128
R2 .311 .73 .929 .314 .731 .93
Notes: Dependent variable: log average wage per worker of multinational aliate. Columns 2 and 5 above
include country, sector and year xed eects. Columns 3 and 6 above include aliate rm xed eects and year
xed eects. `Prot, aliates (parents)' is prot per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). `Capital,
aliates (parents)' is capital per worker of the multinational aliates (parents). Values in parentheses are
standard errors. Signicance levels: *: 0.10; **: 0.05; ***: 0.01.
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Table 11: Appendix C: Descriptive statistics - quality of parent
matches
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: benchmark
Employees dierence 1448 -0.022 1.045
Capital (per worker) dierence 1448 -0.005 0.936
Prot (per worker) dierence 1448 -0.014 1.109
Sales dierence 1448 -0.024 1.064
Age dierence 1442 0.007 1.026
Subsidiary dierence 1448 -0.021 0.589
Same sector 1448 1.000 0.000
Same country 1448 1.000 0.000
Same year 1448 0.335 0.472
Probability dierence 1448 -0.001 0.028
Panel B: matching also on prots
Employees dierence 1446 -0.023 1.048
Capital (per worker) dierence 1446 -0.004 0.940
Prot (per worker) dierence 1446 -0.014 1.106
Sales dierence 1446 -0.023 1.065
Age dierence 1440 0.010 1.038
Subsidiary dierence 1446 -0.020 0.590
Same sector 1446 1.000 0.000
Same country 1446 1.000 0.000
Same year 1446 0.344 0.475
Probability dierence 1446 -0.001 0.028
Notes: The `dierence' variables are measured in terms of a rate, dened as
the ratio between 1) the dierence between the value of the variable for the
original parent and the matched parent, and 2) the mean of the two values.
These ratios are therefore bound between -2 and +2. The `same' variables
(sector, country, year) are dummies equal to one if the variable takes the same
value in the original and matched parents. `Probability dierence' corresponds
to the dierence between the probabilities of being an aliate of the original
and matched parents.
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